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ABSTRACT 
This study considers the effect that judicial and police efficiency exercised on crime 
in 25 of the 33 political-administrative divisions in Colombia during the period 2000-
2011. Specifically, the study seeks to determine whether the reduction of crime 
was the result of increases in the cost of crime as a result of the strengthening of 
the country’s security forces, especially the National Police, or instead was due to 
the greater efficiency of the penal system resulting from a structural change 
stemming from Act 906 of 2004. To view this we propose a model of dynamic 
panel data that not only includes the individual and temporal effects of the 
variables of interest, but also allows us to understand the inertia in criminal 
behavior. The results indicate an inverse relationship between the number of 
crimes and the greater efficiency of the police and judicial action, which is 
consistent with the evidence reported in other international work. Robustness 
checks confirmed the validity of the findings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Classical models of the Economic Theory of Crime argue that the criminal act 
reflects a rational choice made by an individual resulting from a comparison 
between the expected utility of a crime and the cost of committing the crime 
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1974). Thus, the person engages in criminal activity if the 
expected gain derived from the criminal activity is higher than the expected 
sanction. If the penalty is greater than the gain, then we say that the potential 
offender has been deterred from committing a crime (Levitt and Miles, 2006). Thus, 
we can identify two approaches to crime reduction: increasing the probability of 
being caught or increasing the punishment as a sanction for the crime. Studies on 
the reduction of crime have focused their analysis of deterrence on the availability 
of police, assuming that more police officers will increase the probability of catching 
criminals. However, few studies have considered the potential deterrent effect of 
judicial system efficiency on the potential criminal, as the sanction could outweigh 
the gain realized from crimes committed, and even fewer studies have 
simultaneously analyzed police and judicial efficiency. 
 
Violence in Colombia was intense1 at the beginning of the last decade, and in 
response, the national government initiated two separate processes: the 
consolidation and expansion of its security and defense sector, especially during 
the two administrations of President Uribe (2002-06 and 2006-10); and the 
implementation of the Defense and Democratic Security Policy (DSP).  Under both 
aspects a fiscal strategy was adopted to expand the defense sector, and 
consequently the budget increased from 4.6% of GDP in 2002 to 5.2% in 2009. 
These resources enabled investments in infrastructure, logistics, communications, 
intelligence and manpower. Between 2002 and 2010, the total number of members 
of the security forces, including military and police units, increased from 313,406 to 
                                                          
1
 Arbeláez (2012, p. 2) states that in 2002, there was "[...] a daily average of 79 murders, eight kidnappings, 
six terrorist attacks; 14% of municipalities without police presence; one of three mayors exiled from his 
jurisdiction by threats from guerrilla groups, which had a presence in 30 of the 32 departments of Colombia, 
or paramilitary forces, present in 27 of them.” 
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441,828. The most recent data shows growth of over 40% in manpower at the 
national level (Ministry of Defense, 2010). 
 
Higher investment in safety resources matches significant changes in the pattern of 
criminal activity, but the extent to which a causal relationship can be established in 
this area remains unclear. Little is known about the efficiency that was achieved by 
increasing resources to strengthen the coercive and state intelligence apparatus. 
Moreover, it is uncertain whether the reduction of some forms of crime comes from 
the efforts of the armed forces, particularly the police, or from institutional changes 
in the judicial system.  
 
The Colombian justice system has undergone recent reforms intended to increase 
its efficiency, but it still suffers from a backlog in the cases it handles. In the late 
1990s, the country’s judicial institutions were described as only slightly 
independent, corrupt and inefficient, with a rate of 60% or less of new cases 
resolved each year (Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1999). The creation of the Attorney 
General's Office2 (a body between investigator and prosecutor) and the switch from 
an inquisitorial criminal justice system to an oral accusatory system with the Act 
906 of 2004 have been important measures. However, delays and a limited 
capacity to expedite legal processes still restrict the efficiency of the legal system. 
Despite this situation, the initial results of the implementation of the new accusatory 
system seem promising as the system seeks to increase deterrence by being more 
flexible and increasing the expected punishment of the individual offender. The 
effect of this reform on the number of crimes committed is measured directly 
through the index of judicial efficiency and indirectly with a dichotomous variable. 
We also link, as control variables, the amount of drugs seized, the number of 
weapons seized, and economic growth, to the estimations of this study. 
 
This article evaluates the effect of law enforcement and justice on the commission 
of crimes in 25 of the 33 political-administrative divisions in Colombia during the 
                                                          
2
 Article 250.  Colombian Political Constitution. 
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period 2000-2011. Toward this end, a model of dynamic panel data that explains 
the number of total offenses by two variables of interest and a set of control 
variables is proposed. The first two indices contain annual and political-
administrative unit’s information: one index measures the performance of the police 
and examines the effect of the policy (DSP) throughout the time period studied, 
and the other measures the judicial efficiency of the Attorney General's Office in 
the prosecution of the cases investigated. For the construction of these indices, 
data from crimes and arrests are used from five different offenses as well as 
criminal cases that are opened, closed or in process. 
 
The results reveal that rates of police and judicial efficiency have a statistically 
significant and negative effect on crime. Additionally, the results show that the 
transmission mechanisms operate with a delay. 
 
The article is divided into five parts. After the introduction, a theoretical framework 
is presented. Then, data, variables and strategy are described in a methodological 
section. Later, the calculated variables are described and the econometric results 
of the estimated model are shown. Finally, the results are discussed in a 
concluding section.  
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the research on the causes of the deterrence of crime, many authors agree that 
there is an inverse relationship between the probability of being convicted and/or 
punished and the number of crimes committed. The greater the spending on 
police, prosecutors and specialized equipment, the greater the chance of solving 
crimes and catching criminals, according to Becker (1968). Thus, the analysis 
framed in The Economics of Crime concluded that a decrease in crime results from 
a greater effectiveness of the police force, the judiciary or both.  
 
Since Becker, many authors have performed empirical studies to test the first of 
the three relationships described. Ehrlich (1974) associated crime with arrests and 
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noted that there are disincentives that deter criminals from committing crimes and 
positive incentives that lead to legitimate alternatives to criminal behavior. In this 
same line of thought, Garcia, Rodriguez and Dominguez (2013) introduced a police 
efficiency variable based on the expected preventive effect of police efficiency on 
crime.  
 
In addition, Gius (1999) reported that higher per capita spending on police should 
lead to lower rates of crime over time given the odds of being convicted and 
imprisoned, which suggests that criminal behavior is an elastic variable in response 
to increased police strength, as stated by McCormick and Tollison (1984). 
Additionally, and as a complement to Kessler and Levitt (1998) and Levitt (1995a), 
an immediate decrease in crime should be attributed to the deterrence concept that 
must be differentiated from the incapacitation one, as described by Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2004)3. 
 
Empirically, DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) is one of the most common 
methods that have been implemented, and has provided evidence of the deterrent 
effect of police on crime efficiency. Thanassoulis’s work (1995) examining the 
performance of the police in England and Wales is an example of the use of DEA. 
The DEA methodology corresponds to a nonparametric technique developed by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and inspired by Farel (1957) that requires the 
determination of inputs (inputs) and outputs (products) selected by the researcher. 
 
For case of Spain and then in a global study, García et al. (2011, 2013) applied 
DEA to study the effect of police efficiency and effectiveness on crime. This effect 
is divided into operational efficiency and goal effectiveness. The former is the 
ability of the police at a given station to solve cases that were committed within the 
station's geographic area of responsibility, and the latter is the annual change in 
the crime rate. 
                                                          
3
 Deterrence refers to the reduction of crime that occurs due to police presence, and incapacitation is the 
reduction of crime after catching criminals and therefore the emergence of minor criminals engaging in 
criminal activity. 
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The authors define efficiency as the impact of the police on the total welfare of the 
people for the next three years. They consider operational efficiency as the number 
of crimes committed, and goal efficiency as the operational effectiveness of past 
periods. In addition, efficiency has as an input the variation in the number of 
crimes. The outputs are the number of arrests, the inverse of the variance of the 
crimes committed for each of the efficiencies and population changes, and 
indicators of economic activity and tourism rates for three years after a given level 
of efficiency is achieved.  
 
One of the most visible consequences of adopting the approach of the police force 
as the main deterrent to crime is the disproportionate increase in this force in 
election years, which is a strategy for collecting votes. Crime is a critical political 
issue, as in the opinion polls of citizens, this item is a top priority, and even more 
so when the economy is doing well. Therefore, this bolstering of the police force 
during election years as a response to crime, reinforces the findings in the 
literature that law enforcement is a critical deterrent to criminal behavior. 
  
In addition, the operation of the judicial system has been studied in several 
investigations that propose strategies to reduce crime rates. These studies have 
found, for example, that changes in the certainty of punishment are better 
predictors of changes in crime rates than changes in the severity of punishment. 
Additionally, in the short term, immediate crime reduction is attributable to 
deterrence, whereas in the long term, the certainty of judgment plays a leading role 
as a deterrent in reducing the crime rate (Kessler and Levitt, 1998). 
 
The deterrent effect of the judicial system depends on its effectiveness, which, 
according Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999), depends on predictability, speed in 
resolving cases and accessibility to the public, as it is the whole system that 
conducts the investigation of crime reported, solves the case and then dictates a 
sentence to punish the offender. Judicial efficiency has also been analyzed by the 
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DEA method by Deyneli (2011), Pedraja and Salinas (1996), Tulkens (1993) and 
Yeung and Azevedo (2011). In these studies, the inputs include the number of 
judges and administrative staff and the outputs are resolved cases. 
 
Certain studies that examine performance of the police and the judicial system as 
crime deterrents use Becker (1968) as a foundation. Becker argued that higher 
spending on police, prosecutors and specialized equipment increases the 
probability of solving crimes and apprehending criminals, which Nunez, Rivera and 
Villavicencio (2002) demonstrated in the case of Chile. In contrast, Durlauf and 
Nagin (2010) point out that there is little evidence showing that increases in the 
severity of punishment result in significant effects on deterrence, as in the case of 
the death penalty currently enforced in some U.S. states, which does not seem to 
reduce crime (Levitt and Miles, 2006). 
 
In addition to these two deterrent mechanisms that have been the focus of several 
studies, there are, according to other authors, additional types of causes of crime 
reduction. Corman and Mocan (2002) consider the unemployment rate, the 
minimum wage and the number of residents in jail. The authors argue that in 
communities with a high level of social organization, it is more difficult and 
therefore expensive to victimize people for three primary reasons. First, potential 
victims and witnesses take greater risks to protect themselves from offenders. 
Second, criminal behavior is not socially acceptable. Third, it is common for police 
officers to stop and interrogate individuals who are acting in a suspicious manner, 
which ends in the apprehension of the offender. Furthermore, the number of 
weapons distributed in society has elicited important discussions involving those 
who believe in the deterrent effect of weapons (Lott, 2010) and those who do not 
(Duggan, 2000; Ayres and Donohue, 2003). 
 
Levitt (2004) also assigned importance to events and additional variables, showing 
that the unexpected decline in crime during the 1990s in the U.S. was the result of 
increased police, imprisonment, a reduction of crack use and the legalization of 
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abortion. Similarly, to analyze the experience of Latin America, Naritome Soares 
(2010) referred to inequality, police presence and incarceration rates as 
determinants of crime incidence. Soares also argued that crime and violence are 
the second most important political issues in Latin America because they produce 
substantial losses in welfare and present a major obstacle to growth.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The use of dynamic panel data is considered the most appropriate strategy for 
explaining the behavioral determinants of the total crimes per department. The 
independent variables of interest are indices that reflect the operational capacity of 
the police and the judicial system. The control variables that are considered 
appropriate in the Colombian context are related to drug trafficking, weapons, 
regional economic growth and a dummy variable that captures the effect of a 
structural change in the management of justice for the country since 2004. 
 
III.1. Data 
 
The empirical approach for the construction of indicators, which will be finally 
aggregated in the model, requires quantitative primary sources. Table 1 presents 
the descriptive statistics of this information, including data on occurrences for 13 
crimes: manslaughter, kidnapping, auto theft, robbery of commercial 
establishments, robbery of financial institutions, motorcycle theft, robbery of 
people, robbery of residences, extortion, terrorism, and seizure of drugs and 
weapons. Table 1 also presents information regarding the way the judicial criminal 
system works: finished cases (processes) by year, new cases (processes) per year 
and cumulative cases (processes) that come from prior periods for each year. 
Series of departmental gross domestic product are also used. The frequency of 
these data is annual for the 2000-2011 period. The basic units of observation were 
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25 of the 33 political-administrative divisions of Colombia, comprising 32 
departments and the metropolitan area of Bogotá4. 
 
Data on crime occurrence and arrests per crime were obtained from the National 
Crime Police Magazine (issues 46-52). Information on incoming, outgoing and 
accrued lawsuits were obtained from the Attorney General's Office. The National 
Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) provided regional GDP data. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics from primary information 
Variable Observations Media 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimu
m 
Maximum 
C
ri
m
e
s
 
Common homicide 300 763.2 1005.9 30 7269 
Culpable homicide 300 164.8 163 1 855 
Auto theft 300 463.8 1081.7 0 6923 
Robbery of local 
commercial 
establishments 
300 475.6 783.8 2 5768 
Robbery of financial 
institutions 
300 6.1 13.2 0 130 
Motorcycle theft 300 456.9 680.9 1 3874 
Robbery of people  300 1595.7 2602.4 12 16,676 
Residential robberies 300 589.1 944.5 13 5765 
Kidnappings 300 51.9 83.8 0 719 
Extortion 300 61.8 76.3 0 600 
Terrorism 300 26.4 38 0 342 
A
rr
e
s
ts
 
Common homicide 300 241 275 21 1293 
Culpable homicide 300 43.4 119.5 0 1549 
Auto theft 297 104.9 285 0 3348 
Robbery of local 
commercial 
establishments 
275 325.6 553.4 0 3880 
Robbery of financial 
institutions 
271 2.8 6.4 0 68 
Motorcycle theft 275 66.5 132.1 0 1395 
Robbery of people  300 1135 1859.4 2 13,825 
Residential robberies 275 181.7 311.4 0 3032 
Kidnappings 300 31.9 37.1 0 271 
Extortion 300 69.5 79.2 0 537 
                                                          
4
 No individual data are available for eight departments because in these branches, there is no attorney’s 
office. These departments include Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainía, Guaviare, Vaupes, Vichada and San 
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina. 
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Terrorism 300 7.7 11.6 0 87 
L
a
w
s
u
it
s
  New processes 297 18,576.9 33,082.3 75 250,625 
Processes from prior 
periods 
296 10,829.6 17,346.4 57 121,608 
Evacuated processes 296 19,533.8 33,476.3 97 224,445 
  Seized drugs (kg.) 300 5295.5 9450.4 25,62 60,508 
  Seized arms 299 2018.8 3141 109 24,949 
  GDP 300 13,517.7 20,115.4 277 116,988 
  Population 
300 
165,336
8 
1,612,173.0 89,038 7467,804 
Software: STATA12 
 
 
III.2. Variables  
 
The endogenous variable is the total number of crimes in a given year and 
department. The exogenous variables are synthetic indices that refer to police 
operability and judicial efficiency. 
 
The control variables considered are the seizure of drugs, weapons, economic 
growth and a dummy variable that captures the effect of institutional change, which 
led to the introduction of the accusatory criminal system in 2004. Each of these 
variables is briefly explained and defined below. 
 
 Endogenous Variable 
      : Total crime rate. This is defined as the rate of total number of crimes 
committed in department j in year t per 10.000 inhabitants. To calculate this 
occurrence, information for all offenses referred to in the data paragraph is used 
with the exception of seizures of drugs and weapons5. 
 
 Exogenous Variables  
                                                          
5
 The last two are introduced as control variables used in the econometric specification because their behavior 
is guided more by characteristics of the internal armed conflict (public safety) than by crimes commonly 
associated with citizen safety, which is the subject of police action more than of military forces. 
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      : Police operability index is a synthetic measure of the comparative 
effectiveness of policing action in department j in year t, weighted by a bounded 
version of the rate of police efficiency, which is then normalized with respect to its 
distribution range per crime and department throughout the entire period 6.        is 
a value between 0 and 1, being 0 when the rate of efficiency (defined as the 
number of seizures per crimes committed) from all types of crime are at the 
minimum for a given year and department and 1 when the maximum occurs. 
 
      : Judicial efficiency index is a measure of the performance of general 
attorney’s offices in processing criminal investigations in a specific department j in 
year t, which involves their ability to work through the backlog of cases7. The index 
                                                          
6
 The rate of police operation,       , results from the weighted sum of apprehension for the five different 
types of crime committed. The variable        considers the same 11 crimes as        but groups together two 
types of homicides and six types of robberies, resulting in five major types: homicide, theft, terrorism, 
extortion and kidnapping. The relative weight of apprehensions associated with each type of crime are given 
by a standard indicator from the rate of police efficiency,               , here understood as the number of 
captures for crimes committed for each offense type, in each year and department. Thus, 
 
       
∑                                    
 
   
∑                   
 
   
 
 
where                    is the number of seizures associated with criminal type i in department j in year t, 
and the average weight of seizures is defined as 
 
               
                                               
      (                   )                             
  
 
This, by construction, shows a measure whose range is between 0 and 1, where 0 represents a combination of 
no seizures and the worst relative efficiency rate for all crimes and 1 the best efficiency rate for each offense. 
The rate of police efficiency is defined as 
 
              
     
 
             
           
 
 
which may be greater than 1 when the number of seizures is greater than the number of crimes 
committed, either because there are more arrests or because seizures are made for crimes committed in prior 
periods. 
 
7
 The index of judicial efficiency is defined as 
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is a bounded indicator between 0 and 1, which takes the minimum value when the 
system is unable to resolve any case in a given year, and the maximum when it is 
able to resolve both cases entering the system during the period in question and 
those from prior periods. 
 
 Control Variables 
        : Rate of number of kilograms of drugs seized in department j in year t per 
10.000 inhabitants (Uprimmy, Guzmán and Parra, 2013; Freeman, 1991; 
Buonanno, 2003).  
 
        : Rate of the ratio between the number of weapons seized and the number 
of common homicides in department j in year t per 10.000 inhabitants (Sánchez, 
Espinosa and Rivas, 2003). 
 
         : Growth rate of logarithm of the GDP per capita in department j in year t 
(Soares and Naritomi, 2007).  
 
     
   
: Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all departments in all years 
greater than or equal to 2004, when the new accusatory criminal system was 
introduced with Act 906 of the same year, which issued oral procedures into the 
Code of Criminal Procedure System. 
 
III.3 Estimation Methodology  
 
The central purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of police and judicial 
action on criminal behavior in the departments of Colombia during the period 2000-
2011. In the estimating exercise, particular control variables were specifically 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
where               refers to the processes that leave the system in the department j and year t,         
indicates the processes that entered the system in the same department and period t, and           refers 
accumulated processes by the system until t in j department.  
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chosen for Colombia:        ,        ,           and         . The functional 
form of the model to be estimated is as follows: 
 
                                                             
 
The proposed specification corresponds naturally to an econometric panel data 
model in which it is necessary to consider the dynamics required to recover the 
history of the behavior of the total crimes for which certain inertial characteristics 
are presumed as well as the probable delayed effect caused by deterrent action 
and state repression against crime. It is expected that some increases in the rates 
of police and judicial efficiency will adversely affect the overall measure of crime. 
Indeed, the first of them corresponds to the capacity for police action compared in 
a given department and given year considering the number of arrests for crimes 
committed. The second corresponds to the increased ability of the judicial system 
to manage, from beginning to end, all the cases (processes) it receives. Therefore, 
according to conventional economic theory on the commission of crime in 
response to containment and persuasion mechanisms -which would tend to reduce 
the total number of crimes committed- crimes can be forecasted. 
 
The model specification is estimated as follows: 
 
                                                                          
                             
with 
            
    : White sound random variable  
   : Individual heterogeneity among the departments 
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
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   IV.1. Stylized Facts 
 
The dynamics of the criminal activity in different departments of Colombia appear 
to follow a trend contrary to police and judicial system performance at different 
times for the period 2000-2011. Graph 1 shows the average total crime rate per 
100,000 people and judicial efficiency indices throughout 25 political-administrative 
units considered here and during the analysis period. The results show a relative 
increase in crime over the course of the decade analyzed. Between 2000 and 
2011, the average crime rate increased slightly (from 24.7 to 25.7 crimes per 
100,000 pop.); the average from iej fell significantly (from 0.665 to 0.554); and the 
iop index ended at approximately the same level (from 0.456 to 0.469)8.  
 
Graph 1. Averages of the Total crime rate, poi and jei for 25 political-
administrative units in Colombia, 2000-2011. 
 
Source: Based on data from the National Police Crime Magazine; and the Attorney General's Office 
 
 
                                                          
8
 When calculating the total crime rate directly from 100,000 people in the population over the whole 
territory, and not as an average among political and administrative units, it is possible to identify a slight 
reduction between 2000 and 2011. Indeed, in that scenario the crime rate fell from 26.73 to 26.43 However, 
this reduction is relatively insignificant considering the length of the period. 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Average of the Total crime rate (left) Average iop (right) Average iej (right)
15 
 
Graph 2 shows maps that gather the overall crime rate directly from politico-
administrative units in 2000 and 20119. Criminality showed a declining tendency in 
the interior departments and an increasing tendency in the Atlantic Coast and 
border departments to the east and southwest of the country. Only in 12 of the 25 
units did crime decrease. The departments that showed increasing crime rates per 
capita at the end of the decade were Meta, Caquetá, Valle del Cauca, Sucre, 
Magdalena and Boyacá, where the rate increased 373.7%, 105.7%, 102.5%, 
100.3%, 96.6% and 76.7%, respectively. However, crime showed a greater 
reduction in Norte de Santander, Atlantic, Risaralda, Santander, Antioquia and 
Chocó, where the rate fell 93.2%, 89.2%, 88.1%, 74.2%, 57.9% and 45.1%, 
respectively. 
 
Graph 2. Maps of the total crime rate in 25 political-administrative units in 
Colombia 2000 and 2011. 
 
 
Note: The considered ranks were based on the quantiles of variables’ distributions. 
Software: ArcGIS 
                                                          
9
 The scales of the maps are identical, and the quintiles represent the joint distribution of the 50 data points 
per crime committed in both 2000 and 2011. 
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Analyses from the spatial distribution of the three variables of interest suggest that 
the changes over the course of the decade with regard to committed crimes 
and poi were different from one unit to another. The change in jei was almost 
totally negative. The police operability showed better performance in most of the 
departments at the end of the decade, but there were many cases in which the 
opposite occurred and the average level remained virtually unchanged10. Besides, 
the judicial efficiency index has consistently reduced over the course of the decade 
throughout the whole territory11. 
IV.2 Estimation Results 
 
The model 
                                                                          
                             
 
was estimated as a dynamic panel following the methodology of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000). The estimation methods used are 
robust to heteroskedasticity problems; reports of statistical tests in relation to the 
unit roots, correlation, and endogeneity that are needed to ensure the theoretical 
assumptions under which the results are valid are provided in Appendix 1. Table 2 
presents the report of the estimation model. 
 
Table 2. Estimation Results. 
Variable abgmm1 
total crime rate 
 
                                                          
10
 The political-administrative units with a value in iop below 0.5 increased from 12 in 2000 to 17 in 2011. 
However, the change was positive in 13 units, among which Risaralda, Cauca, Norte de Santander, Santander, 
Atlántico and Chocó stand out. The situation was different in departments such as Guajira, Valle del Cauca, 
Meta, Magdalena, Huila and Cesar, where the indicator deteriorated. 
 
11
 The index of judicial efficiency was below 0.57 in 60% of the political-administrative units that were 
studied in 2011, whereas in 2000, only one of the units was below that level. Also, the indicator was worse in 
2011 than in 2000 in all units except Caldas and the Atlantic departments. The worst judicial performance 
departments were Huila, Meta and Cesar. 
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L1. .845*** 
.0956*** L2. 
Poi 
 
D1. -12.871*** 
Jei 
 
L1. -8.729* 
drugs 
L1. 
 
-0.002 
arms  -.1872*** 
growth  -159.777** 
dummy -4.455*** 
constant 171.026** 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Software: STATA12 
 
The results confirm that for the exogenous variables rates of police efectiveness, 
poi, and judicial efficiency, jei have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. The transmission mechanism also operates with a delay that goes in 
line with the economic theory of crime and this paper’s hypothesis. In the case of 
prosecution, the results suggest significant effects on crime one year after its 
implementation, and deterrence seems to be mitigated by the high volume of 
pending cases. Additionally, the police action seems to have had an impact based 
on the positive changes in the operational effectiveness of the police from one year 
to another. 
 
Regarding control variables, the results show that, although not statistically 
significant, the rate of drug seizure is inversely related to the crimes. For the 
growth of GDP in each department and the rate of seizure of arms, the findings 
show that the effect is statistically significant and negative. These findings suggest 
that an increase in the proxy of legal income (departmental GDP) would decrease 
crime, which is consistent with Becker’s (1986) proposition that committing crimes 
is more expensive compared to the expected returns from legal activity. 
Additionally, the negative sign of the parameter associated with the weapons 
seizure can be explained from two perspectives: first, by the appellant hypothesis 
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in the literature that argues "more guns, more crime" (Duggan, 2000), and second, 
based on the increased potential cost of crime that demands the use of weapons, 
whose use is reduced by police action. Finally, the results validate the hypothesis 
that institutional change of the judicial system in 2004 reduced crime. 
 
To evaluate the robustness of the results, different specifications were taken into 
account with the final objective of considering variant forms of exogenous 
variables, endogenous variables and estimation methods. Table 3 reports five of 
the estimated models, and overall, we can conclude that the variables of interest 
retain the significance and expected signs under the assumptions, as shown by the 
fact that the confidence intervals for the parameters have very similar features, 
ensuring the consistency of the estimates. However, when considered variables 
change its specification, the parameters undergo a change of sign, which is a 
counterintuitive result that is not supported by economic theory. Then, the obtained 
results in the experiment verify the robustness of the model estimated initially. 
Robustness tests designed with partial changes in the specification of checks and 
the structure of the variables of interest support the validity of the findings. 
 
Table 3. Robustness tests. 
Variable Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
total crime rate         
 
L1. .829*** .881*** .9049805*** .874*** .849*** 
L2. .108*** 0.026 -0.009 .0806*** .0875** 
Poi         
 
D1. -13.437*** -13.861*** -13.935***   -12.020*** 
L1.       6.003**   
Jei         
 
L1. -9.432** -8.496** -6.517   
 
D1.         9.197** 
drugs         
 
L1. -0.001 -.007** -.006* -.003* -0.001 
arms -.188*** -.233***     -.184*** 
growth  -170.067** -189.307** -165.757**   -155.708** 
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dummy -5.170*** -4.942*** -3.734*** -4.873*** -4.724*** 
iej2 
          
(=EvacuatedP/NewP) 
L1.       1.249   
arms/population  
    0.148 0.142   
(rate x 10,000 pop) 
Growth         0.916 
Constant 174.874** 199.774** 15.108* 173.606** 161.697** 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Software: STATA12 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
Over the past decade, Colombia has made substantial efforts to expand and 
strengthen its military and police forces while making major changes to its criminal 
law. These efforts have unevenly affected the commission of certain crimes in time 
and space, but little research has been conducted to establish the extent to which 
a causal relationship between these phenomena exists. In fact, it is interesting to 
estimate the direction of the potential impact to test the theoretical hypothesis that 
the criminal acts rationally, conducting a cost-benefit analysis that considers the 
threat of arrest by the police or prosecution by the judges as an opportunity cost for 
committing crimes. 
 
The results support our initial hypothesis indicating that increased efficiency in 
police or judicial operations reduces the overall crime rate. Nonetheless, the effect 
of repressive police action seems to have a stronger statistical relationship than the 
action of justice persuasion. The dummy variable that captures the effect of 
changing the criminal law adversely affects the dependent variable, which would 
strengthen the traditional effect of the greater efficiency of the judicial system as a 
whole. Thus, in terms of public policy, police personnel will require access to 
adequate technical, mobility and research resources. Further, the police must have 
support from departmental and local authorities to improve the operational and 
research capabilities of these forces. They must allocate its own resources to 
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complement the fiscal effort of the national government in this subject.  On the 
other hand, the findings suggest that the prosecuting body requires strategies that 
will allow for a better use of resources to reduce the caseload of its various units. 
 
Increased access to legal income, as seen through regional economic growth, 
reduces criminal activity, presumably as a result of lower incentives to engage in 
this activity. Specifically, efforts to foster regional economic growth will facilitate the 
realization of legal opportunities. 
 
The number of weapons seized also adversely affects the magnitude of crimes 
because it increases the cost of the means to commit a crime. As the deterrent 
effect of the seizure of weapons on crimes showed, it is appropriate for different 
levels of government to promote the seizure of arms in order to facilitate the 
operation of authorities in reducing crime. 
 
From the point of view of public policy promoting regional security, these results 
are relevant. Certainly, it seems that the effectiveness of the police and judicial 
system at the regional level are the factors that affect criminal activity in the 
territory rather than increasing the severity or length of sentences. Thus, 
conducting research on the specific institutional mechanisms through which 
positive, significant and stable changes can be induced in the performance of 
these factors is vital. 
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Annex 
Annex 1: Statistical Tests 
The results of statistical tests that validate the robustness of the model are 
presented in the table. Among these are unit root tests and the Sargan and 
Hansen tests to eliminate possible endogeneity problems. 
 
Test Characteristic 
Statistical 
value 
P Value Conclusion 
Pesaran-Shin Unit Root -21.086 0.018 Some panels are stationary 
AR(1) Autocorrelation -2.41 0.016 First lag correlation 
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AR(2) Autocorrelation -1.39 0.166 No second lag correlation 
AR(3) Autocorrelation 1.18 0.237 No third lag correlation 
Sargan Instrument validation  216.47 0.347 Instruments are valid 
Hansen Instrument validation  18.7 1 Instruments are valid 
Hansen in 
levels.  
Instrument validation in 
levels 
-4.36 1 
At levels, the instruments 
are valid 
Hansen 
subgroup 
Instrument validation in 
levels 
14.56 0.951 
The main instruments are 
valid 
Software: STATA12 
 
The Arellano-Bond test considering three laps ensures no autocorrelation 
between errors and lagged exogenous variables. 
 
The Sargan and Hansen tests help ensure the validity of the instruments used in 
the estimated individual and overall models. 
